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Shakespearean Legal Thought  
in International Dispute Settlement 
 
Thomas Schultz* and François Ost** 
 
 
Abstract: In this article, the authors examine the contributions of 
Shakespearean legal thought to our understanding of core aspects of 
international dispute settlement. These aspects include: the sweeping 
role of masks in law and in the resolution of disputes; the construction 
and deconstruction of authority; the purpose of law in arousing desire 
and thus action; the limits in recognizing informal international law 
as law; the benefits of exaggeration; the problematic ambition of 
adjudicators; the key role of passion, against rationality, in 
understanding and dealing with international disputes; the decision-
making resources to be found in logics of life; exercising measure in 
the enforcement and reach of law; remembering that law deals with 
human beings in our quest for law’s purity and systematic 
organization; resisting single-mindedness; the relevance of a dialectic 
form of proportionality; and the inescapable need to embrace 
uncertainty. The authors also discuss the general relevance of law & 
literature, and law & theatre, for all manner of legal professionals 
and review Shakespeare’s own legal background and thus his a priori 
ability to deal with legal matters. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Thinking outside the box may be a voguish credo, but we lawyers, 
academic or not, have a tendency to embrace it more often as a figure 
of speech than as an actual principle of action. Interdisciplinary 
thinking may be a constant mantra, but less often is it clear what that 
really means. And its actual practice is yet rarer. So ‘Shakespeare and 
International Dispute Settlement’ may appear to be quite a bit outside 
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the box, to the point that the box of international dispute settlement 
seems forgotten entirely. The late International Court of Justice judge 
Gerald Fitzmaurice would probably be all too happy to concur: ‘the 
real fault of the lawyers’, he opined, ‘probably is that they have not, as 
lawyers, been single-minded enough, and have not resisted the 
temptation to stray into other fields.’1 Lawyers, he thought, should 
really deal with just law.  
For indeed, what could international dispute settlement scholars 
possibly learn from Shakespeare about their field? Should arbitration 
practitioners, should policy-makers in this area venture out into this 
wild territory?  
Fitzmaurice would insist, shake his head no, and try to drive the 
point home with this cute logical conundrum: ‘the value of the legal 
element depends on its being free of other elements or it ceases to be 
legal.’2  
Ironically enough, arguments like this would disappear in a puff 
of logic were it not for the rescuing force of theatricalities. The 
validity and persuasiveness of such arguments owe evidently less to 
rules of critical thinking than to rules of rhetoric. Theatre helps us 
understand these rules particularly well, in a way that goes far beyond 
the ordinary focus in rhetoric on the knockout delectation of a well-
turned phrase. 
Law and theatre, in truth, are intimately linked.  
They share some of the same societal objectives. Both for 
instance involve the portrayal of and collective engagement with 
various forms of human dignity, in the form of providing for catharsis 
for example. The day theatres and courtrooms will close, civil wars 
will most likely erupt.  
They share some of the same rhetorical tricks. Both for instance 
depart from rules of critical thinking and logical argumentation, which 
would elsewhere be considered argumentative fallacies. In fact, the art 
of some of the main protagonists of both worlds, the actor and the 
advocate, have much in common.  
                                                
1 Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The United Nations and the Rule of Law’ 38 Transactions of the 
Grotius Society 135 (1953) 142. 
2 ibid, 140. 
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They share some of the same formal and contextual narrative 
requirements. Both demand narrative lucidity, reliability, and 
consistency, as well as simple socio-cultural embeddedness.3  
They share certain aesthetic similarities. The things that make 
drama aesthetically pleasant resemble the things that make justice 
aesthetically pleasant. As Carol Chillington Rutter put it, the 
courtroom and the stage are both ‘performative spaces’; they have 
always been spaces ‘where stories were told and contested; where 
language was charged and words worked; where speech, embodied, 
was action and claims and counterclaims, equally weighted, hung in 
the air simultaneously; where the next entrance, the next witness 
might bring into play evidence to explode the entire narrative to date; 
where tragedy, comedy (and farce) were always potential’.4 All in all, 
the stage and the courtroom have to meet some of the same demands 
and expectations, expressed by some of the same audiences.  
The simple point is this: what makes a story a good story largely 
overlaps with what makes a judgment a good judgment, and what 
makers party submissions good. After all, judgments and party 
submissions are legal story; and legal stories are stories. As Daniel del 
Gobbo puts it, ‘legal authors, like literary authors, are storytellers’.5  
From this a further point follows: narratology – the study of 
narration, of storytelling – should naturally be highly informative for 
what is occasionally called ‘judiciology’ – the study of all things 
judicial. As Andrea Bianchi puts it, with many examples taken from 
the International Court of Justice, ‘evaluat[ing] judgments through the 
lens of literary techniques and rhetorical tools’ may prove surprisingly 
illuminating.6 Then again, if the reflexes taught in law school are taken 
away, which are often limiting, it is in fact not surprising at all. The 
things that make a story unreliable (in the sense of implausible, un-
relatable, etc.) tend to make decisions in adjudication unreliable too. 
And the same applies, again, to party submissions: as probably 
                                                
3 Daniel Del Gobbo, ‘Unreliable Narration in Law and Fiction’ (2017) 30 Canadian Journal 
of Law & Jurisprudence 311. 
4 Carol Chillington Rutter, Foreword to Paul Raffield and Gary Watt (eds), Shakespeare and 
the Law (Hart 2008) vi. 
5 Del Gobbo, ‘Unreliable Narration’, 312. 
6 Andrea Bianchi, ‘International Adjudication, Rhetoric and Storytelling’ 9 Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement xxx (2018), [p 3 in PAP] 
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everyone who has every taught advocacy would confirm, the key idea 
is ‘to give them a good story’. So the requirements of good lawyering 
in international dispute settlement simply bear remarkable, if often 
underestimated, similarities with the requirements of good narration. 
And in turn this leads to another point. If we want to understand 
conflicts and power struggles within a legal field, à la Marx or 
Bourdieu, then narratology may again help. As Bianchi explains, it 
helps us ‘understand who are those who weave the narrative thread, 
what are their ideas and beliefs, how they perceive their role and 
perform their function’7 – in sum, it helps us perceive who writes the 
story and why. 
So law and theatre and intimately linked. There is, then, a patent 
interest in noticing how these links can illuminate our understanding 
of legal questions. Beyond that and more specifically, an approach so 
strongly rooted in the humanities, so attuned to one of humanities’ key 
modes of expression – storytelling – can provide something critical: 
context and thought experiments.  
Context and thought experiments are the most obvious analytical 
lenses Shakespeare provides to international dispute settlement 
scholars, practitioners, and policymakers. Social, axiological, 
rhetorical, historical, ethnographic, anthropological, even educational 
context. Context for the box outside which we want to think. Context 
that allows us to take a step back, to rise above the immediacy of the 
legal question posed by a case and the peremptory values that too 
promptly offer themselves for its resolution, like an unimaginative 
hand-raising student. Context to put things into historical perspective 
too.  
Seriously, thinking about law with no interest for its context only 
provokes the sort of cynical remark offered by the late constitutional 
lawyer Thomas Reed Powell: ‘If you have a mind that can think about 
something that is inextricably connected with something else, without 
thinking about the something else, then you have The Legal Mind.’8 
Would any good lawyer really want to have such a mind? It would be 
a mind closed to the humanities, impervious to culture, unconnected to 
our civilization’s intellectual achievements. 
                                                
7 ibid, [p 3 in PAP]. 
8 Quoted by Pierre Schlag, The Enchantment of Reason (Duke University Press 1998) 121. 
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Yet international dispute settlement is indeed habitually taught, 
practiced, and thought of as an almost purely technical field. Quite 
often it illustrates Andrea Bianchi’s general lament about international 
law: ‘there is hardly any awareness of the discipline’s theoretical 
presuppositions amongst practicing international lawyers’; it has ‘been 
lacking in reflexivity and intellectual questioning for a long time’; its 
leaders ‘are not particularly inclined to ask questions’.9 International 
dispute settlement is usually understood to be a subject-matter focused 
on procedural technicalities and black letter law intricacies. It is 
routinely portrayed, not entirely without self-interest, as the exclusive 
preserve of experts and specialists.  
In reality its nature makes it anything but an autopoietic field. 
What could be more fundamentally, more widely human than to 
resolve disagreements between people or their representatives, from 
minor personal quarrels to full-blown armed conflicts, so that they can 
continue to live together? As Gary Watt puts it, ‘Dispute is the heart 
of human drama.’10 Dispute settlement, at heart, is anything but a dry, 
technical, mechanical field.  
If the entire enterprise we are engaging here had to be reduced to 
just one cursory take-home point, the point would be this: we need to 
re-center international dispute settlement as a human activity, above 
and beyond the humdrum of the technicalities of the applicable rules, 
to give dispute settlement a human context, to ‘de-expertify’ it, and to 
show what this concretely means – with all its contradictions, 
uncertainties, entangled perspectives, and doubts.  
Shakespeare, of course, is special. After all, he is the best-selling 
fiction author of all time, with an estimated 4 billion copies of work 
sold. He probably is the one literary figure who mostly strongly 
marked the way we think about justice and law.11 He is special 
enough, we believe, to stand out like a sore thumb against mostly any 
so-what disinterest among individuals centered on international 
dispute settlement. Probably, as a lawyer, one might get away with a 
                                                
9 Andrea Bianchi, ‘On Asking Questions: Philosophy and Theory in International Law’ in 
Andrea Bianchi (ed.), Theory and Philosophy of International Law (Edward Elgar 2017) 1-2.  
10 Gary Watt, ‘Sovereigns, Sterling and “Some bastards too!”: Brexit seen from 
Shakespeare’s King John’ 9 Journal of International Dispute Settlement xxx (2018). 
11 An in-depth discussion of Shakespeare’s many contributions to our understanding of law 
can be found in François Ost, Shakespeare, la comédie de la Loi (Michalon 2012). 
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limited interest in literature by arguing that it is the preserve of the 
humanist renaissance man. But which lawyer, frankly, could 
dignifiedly say that she has no interest, no time for the Bard of Avon? 
To make an arresting parallel, it is probably acceptable for most of us, 
in the competitive environment that is our business, to say that we are 
not interested in sentiments and feelings; but who could dignifiedly 
say that love is unimportant? So Shakespeare is to law & theatre what 
love is to sentiments. 
Indeed at quite the other end of the spectrum of skepticism about 
the relevance of Shakespeare for the study of international dispute 
settlement, there are those for whom this long introduction-cum-plea 
is superfluous. It is unneeded to ask whether Shakespeare could be 
relevant. He is so obviously relevant, for our understanding of 
everything legal. Obviously, he is an emblematic protagonist of the 
law & literature movement. And obviously, law & literature is a 
particularly relevant approach to law: we are homo fabulans first and 
foremost; we are storytelling beings; our rationality, the way we 
ordinarily think, is primarily narrative and only secondarily theoretical 
or practical.  
Shakespeare is also special to us lawyers because he concretely 
contributed to shaping law’s rhetoric, its contents even. He still does 
today. He is cited by the highest courts of several countries. His work 
serves as authority. His work is a rhetorical device. More profoundly, 
he influenced our collective imaginaries, our understandings of 
justice. He thereby framed our expectations from law, which feed 
back into law’s rhetoric. ‘Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of 
the world’, the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley used to say. Shakespeare, 
Ian Ward argues now, is in many ways the unacknowledged legislator 
of the English constitution: he is the poet of its imaginary, 
foundational cornerstones.12  
As our enthusiasm for Shakespeare mounts, perhaps a word of 
reassurance, combined with a quick example of his relevance, is 
apposite. 
‘Let’s kill all the lawyers’, his most widely popular line about 
lawyers, was not meant to make them run for the hills (though some 
                                                
12 Ian Ward, ‘Littérature et imaginaire juridique’ (1999) 42 Revue interdisciplinaire d’études 
juridiques 161. 
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chiding was indeed intended). Context, as lawyers certainly know, is 
everything. So here is the context: the line was uttered in this 
exchange between two self-styled class-warriors, the bedraggled Jack 
Cade and his follower Dick the Butcher: ‘Cade: [A]ll shall eat and 
drink on my score, and I will apparel them all in one livery, that they 
may agree like brothers, and worship me their lord. Dick: The first 
thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers. Cade: Nay, that I mean to do.’13 
Their plan is to engineer some sort of coup, put Cade on some sort of 
throne. For this they need to get law and lawyers out of the way. 
Shakespeare plays the audience: lawyers are initially represented as 
vile parchment-pushers, perpetuating class injury, keeping the 
common folk down: a portrayal that does not exactly attract sympathy 
from the audience. At this stage, it seem that the class-warriors will 
carry the day. But then Cade, to achieve his end, decides that 
henceforth ‘the laws of England’ will ‘come out of [his] mouth’, a 
mouth that shall be ‘the parliament of England’. He, Cade, will be the 
new law and lawyers – an incarnation that is now in stark contrast 
with the audience’s likely intuitive grasp of what law is all.  
What Shakespeare did here is representative of much of both his 
work and its relevance for the study of law. He put the audience in a 
laboratory, in this case to experiment a narrative detour through non-
law. It is a laboratory of flights towards idealized hopes and harsh 
downfalls back unto reality. Upon emerging from the lab, the audience 
typically concedes that lawyers should, after all, stay put, and should 
stay alive a bit longer.  
Such double-takes, such experimentation with radical 
hypotheses, such imagined trial runs of human trajectories, are indeed 
typical of Shakespeare. In this case, the narrative contrast makes the 
point about the importance of law and lawyers more persuasively than 
any straightforward support likely would have.  
More often though, Shakespeare does not engage in any sort of 
advocacy. More often, his purpose is to suggest a variety of equally 
valid ways to look at the same situation. The situations he stages are 
thus represented as inherently uncertain. The audience is led to 
embrace that uncertainty. This focus on the diversity of legitimate 
                                                
13 Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part 2 Act 4, scene 2, 71–78. 
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views, this acceptance of inherent uncertainty: these are some of the 
traits of his work that make it promising, at best, or intriguing, at 
worst, for the study of international disputes. Indeed in the settlement 
of international disputes, the confines of law and of justice seem more 
often experimented with than they tend to be in many modern 
domestic legal systems. 
Shakespeare’s writings are indeed a universal laboratory for the 
thought experiments we mentioned above. A laboratory for the 
inherent tensions within the law we endlessly revisit and which so 
often permeate the resolution of international disputes. An imaginary 
place to put the ‘what-ifs’ of our core legal dilemmas through their 
paces. In a laconically selective survey of the questions his writings 
help us think about we could mention these: spirit vs letter, formalism 
vs equity, legality vs legitimacy, rigorous enforcement vs mercy and 
forgiveness (Measure for Measure, The Tempest, The Merchant of 
Venice); factual vs juridical truth, and the justice to be found in the use 
of circumstantial evidence (A Winter’s Tale); vengeance vs 
forgiveness (Hamlet, Richard II, Titus Andronicus, Julius Caesar, but 
also again The Merchant of Venice and Measure for Measure); the 
wrongfulness and rightfulness of sovereignty (Hamlet); but also the 
games and battles of interpretation (The Merchant of Venice); freedom 
during the storms that follow tyranny (Richard II, Measure for 
Measure); legal immunities (Titus Andronicus); international 
humanitarian law and war crimes (Henry V); amicus curiae (The 
Merchant of Venice); and much more. As a matter of fact, even parties 
to international disputes can find inspiration in the trajectories 
produced by the Shakespearean laboratories: should one abdicate like 
Richard II, resist like Shylock, call public sanction upon oneself like 
Angelo? 
This article moves in two parts. Part I discusses the legal 
influences of Shakespeare’s work. Part II explores legal themes in 
Shakespeare’s work. 
 
 
1. Shakespeare’s Law 
 
If Shakespeare’s work yields universally valid questions and lessons 
for our understanding of law, the making of this work was very much 
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influenced by altogether contingent factors. If his thought experiments 
with law put our legal questions into perspective, the experiments 
themselves should be put into perspective too, to give a context to the 
materials his plays played with.  
William Shakespeare was born in 1564 and died 52 years later, 
in 1616. His father, John, was for a while a prominent businessman 
and a town leader in Stratford-upon-Avon, endowed with honours and 
red robes on official occasions, which included the exercise of legal 
functions. But in suitably dramatic fashion, he brutally collapsed out 
of business and honours, for unknown reasons, in 1577. His son was a 
fragile 13 years old. His plays would later be full of kings and princes 
fallen from grace, terrorized by doubt. (When we really write, we 
write with our blood.) 
Of William’s life we know surprisingly little. It is generally 
believed that he exercised lowly legal functions as a ‘noverint’, an 
attorney’s clerk, in Stratford. 14 It is tempting to think that this allowed 
him to learn of the details of the suicide of one Katherine Hamlett in 
1579 – whether she pondered her act in terms of ‘to be or not to be’ is 
of course unknown.15 What we do know with more certitude is that 
graphologists recognize a jurist in his handwriting; that a highly 
technical law book was found in his personal library; that the moto on 
his family’s coat of arms, which his father had applied for before 
William was born and was granted some 30 years later, was ‘non sans 
droict’. Besides, many legal commentators have been eager to 
recognize their walk of life in the Bard’s writings (perhaps the grown-
up equivalent of teenagers recognizing themselves in rock stars), in 
the way he weighs the pros and cons of the questions he addresses. 
They thus think they discern the presence of a legal mind. 
His exercise of legal functions also extended to personal brushes 
with the law. He was a plaintiff and a defendant on multiple 
occasions, including a number of protracted lawsuits. To be fair, these 
were particularly litigious times (a historical comparator that should 
usefully be kept in mind to contextualise current complaints about the 
litigiousness of society). Yet Shakespeare seems to have been even 
                                                
14 Paul Raffield, Shakespeare's Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution: Late Elizabethan 
Politics and the Theatre of Law (Hart 2010) 153-4. 
15 Peter Ackroyd, Shakespeare: The Biography (Vintage 2006) 81-82. 
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more vigorously eager to be in court than his average contemporaries: 
he was, in the words of Daniel Kornstein, ‘a walking litigation 
factory’.16  
His father had himself been involved in some 50 lawsuits of all 
sorts, including about a legal dispute concerning the contract for a 
loan of £40, which lasted a good 20 years and involved two 
generations of plaintiffs and defendants.17 Indeed the son, as soon as 
he was old enough to do so, attended or participated in many of his 
father’s cases, before becoming involved in his own many cases, 
many of which echoed in his plays. Just one example: the £40, 20-year 
saga was litigated with one Edmund, a brother-in-law of William’s 
mother; Edmund, like the main antagonist in King Lear, an 
illegitimate son who resolves to get rid of his brother and his father. 
(Sometimes, conversely, it is life that seems to find inspiration in 
Shakespeare’s plays: his daughter Susanna successfully sued a man 
for defamation in 1613 who had accused her of adultery – a distant 
echo of the slanders of infidelity in Much Ado About Nothing (1959), 
Othello (1603), and The Winter’s Tale (1611).)  
And so Kornstein concludes: ‘Shakespeare may not have been 
professionally trained as a lawyer, but he surely had a long and 
expensive education in the law.’18 So much, then, for arguments, based 
on Bourdieusian symbolic violence, that his work cannot offer reliable 
insights into the workings of the law because he was an inexperienced 
outsider. And really, Quentin Skinner points out, his forensic 
eloquence was uncanny.19 
Moving on from his life to his line of work, the law looms even 
larger. Indeed Shakespeare’s work, as theatre in England generally at 
the time, was mostly crafted under rather stringent legal and political 
constraints. These constraints altered English theatre quite profoundly 
and, arguably, even ushered modern theatre into life. But it was not 
just constraints. Theatre, from writing to performance, was really 
embedded in the legal and political games of the time, often at the 
                                                
16 Daniel Kornstein, Kill All the Lawyers? Shakespeare's Legal Appeal (University of 
Nebraska Press 2005) 19.  
17 Giuseppina Restivo, ‘Inheritance in the Legal and Ideological Debate of Shakespeare’s 
King Lear’ in P Raffield and G Watt (eds), Shakespeare and the Law (Hart 2008) 170-1. 
18 Kornstein, Kill All the Lawyers, 20. 
19 Quentin Skinner, Forensic Shakespeare (OUP 2014). 
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highest levels of power. It both responded to and triggered some of 
these legal and political constraints. 
To be sure, it would be a significant understatement to say that 
theatre was merely a form of entertainment, a place where people 
could find diversions from unchangeable lives. It was quite the 
opposite, really: it would be no overstatement to say that theatre was 
an instrument of power, in ways we might find difficult to recognize 
today. More precisely, it entertained with the established political, 
moral, and religious authorities a somewhat dialectic relationship: on 
the one hand, it acted as a counter-power, producing and nurturing 
alternative ways of thinking, alternate norms and values; on the other 
hand, it was used by some of the powers in place as a device to trigger 
movements in their great political chess games.  
To understand theatre’s role as a counter-power at the time, 
picture the crowds that plays typically attracted. These were fairly 
rowdy, often boisterous crowds, large and prone to unrest, traversed 
by civil movements. Crowds not unlike those of today’s football 
stadiums, though perhaps even more democratically representative, 
involving even broader bands of the people. Somewhat unlike today’s 
theatre dwellers. Theatre, in short, was widely popular.  
The first problem this created was that as theatre audiences 
grew, church audiences shrank. The reaction, inevitable, had been 
mapped out by Socrates nearly 2000 years earlier. Recall: he was 
found guilty of corrupting the youth and not believing in the gods of 
the state. In turn the theatres became accused of moral turpitude and 
impiety, of harbouring subversive thoughts, of fostering political riots. 
(They were, to be fair, also blamed for creating sanitary hazards; 
plague epidemics were indeed a problem.) The City Fathers, the 
municipal authorities of the time, led the charge. 
One thing that greatly bothered the authorities, to put it in the 
language of contemporary legal theory, was the creation, 
development, nurturing of parallel norms. These were norms beyond 
the state, values that the authorities did not quite agree with. And all 
of this took place in what one may consider to be free zones. They 
were largely beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal authorities, 
places where the authorities’ regular orders of theatre demolitions 
rarely had real effects. Although after a particularly wild riot that had 
started in the wake of a performance and that soon spread to the 
12 
 
Northern bank of the Thames, the Privy Council effectively shut down 
the theatres for three months. It forced Shakespeare and his fellow 
actors to find refuge in the countryside.   
It really is not too hard to see in this parallels with current legal 
pluralism debates. It is as if different legal orders were playing out in 
theatres. Not, of course, legal orders in the Austinian sense that 
different rules there led to different sanctions. But in the sense of 
different spheres of justice, different normative references, different 
trials of the same situations. Notice all the trials in Shakespeare’s 
plays based on real events. They had real symbolic effects, which 
move crowds more than most formal legal sanctions.  
This also just might remind us of the best of international 
arbitration, when it creates parallel spheres of justice. Spheres of 
justice that are broader and more perennial that the justice that tends to 
be rendered within the strict boundaries of the traditional court 
system. Spheres of justice that remind us of the infinite variety of 
international disputes and that their characterization as ‘legal’ is really 
nothing more than a conventional construct. Boltanski and Thévenot 
come to mind here to illustrate the point: they mark out six fields of 
human activity, each inhabited by its own ‘principles of judgment’, 
separate and distinct from what we lawyers tend to think of, in 
keeping with good legal tradition, as the only real principles of 
judgment, those that occupy state courts.20  
Arbitration, clearly, is not only a dispute settlement mechanism 
that deals with state-sanctioned legal relationships, when the parties 
choose to resort to a private method of dispute resolution to opt out of 
state courts, which we lawyers tend to think of as the necessary 
reference, the inevitable point of departure, when discussing all 
matters law.  
At least from sociological and anthropological perspectives, and 
of course from a literary perspective, arbitration also operates on the 
fringes of ‘the law’. It operates in areas which escape, by design or by 
happenstance, top-down regulation by states and instituted law. These 
areas, or spheres of justice, are perhaps without (official) rule of law, 
                                                
20 Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, On Justification: Economies of Worth (Princeton 
University Press 2006). 
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but precisely not without a need for justice.21 Whether certain types of 
international commercial disputes, international investment disputes, 
and some international disputes relating to the internet (all classic 
examples for theories on law without the state) represent examples of 
such spheres of justice, of such fields of human activity – this is a long 
and complex discussion, often bogged down in the law literature by 
political and professional agendas.22 And it is not necessary to have 
that discussion to make our point. The point is that theatre plays, both 
in their actual operations and in their narrative contents, represent 
alternate spheres of justice, with alternate norms and values. In that 
they invite a comparison with global legal pluralism and some 
operations of arbitration. 
And, a bit like states and private regulations and alternative 
justice, a bit like arbitration throughout much of its history and much 
of the world, theatres were subject to a constant guerrilla from 
established powers. But it was quite more violent.  
In 1593, Christopher Marlowe, one of the other great 
Elizabethan playwright and poet, was arrested on allegations of 
blasphemy but soon released. Ten days later, however, he was stabbed 
to death in murky circumstances.  
A few years later, Ben Jonson, the other major playwright of the 
time, was arrested on charges of ‘lewd and mutinous’ behaviour for 
having co-authored the satirical comedy The Isle of Dogs, and serves 
three months in jail. What exactly the play made fun of is unknown: 
the original manuscript was destroyed in 1597 and no copy is known 
to exist.  
And then, in 1642, on the eve of the English Civil War, after 
Shakespeare’s death, the Puritans finally carried the day: Parliament 
ordered the closing of theatres. Shakespeare’s Globe was pulled down 
two years later. Dramatic art grinded to a halt. The theatres stayed 
closed for 20 years.  
Perhaps this suggests that alternate spheres of justice tend to 
need charismatic figures and astute political players to keep them 
                                                
21 François Ost, ‘Arbitration and Literature’, in Thomas Schultz and Federico Ortino (eds), 
Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration (OUP, forthcoming 2018). 
22 See for instance Thomas Schultz, Transnational Legality: Stateless Law and International 
Arbitration (OUP 2014). 
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going. Shakespeare certainly was a master in both. It may then not be 
a wild conjecture to argue that some of the afflictions that investment 
arbitration endures today are due to the disappearance of the so-called 
Grand Old Men,23 who protected commercial arbitration until all 
vigorous critical movements were stopped. 
As we said above, theatre was also used, sometimes, by the 
powers in place as an instrument of their own power. Perhaps one of 
the most striking examples is offered by the use of Richard II as an 
instrument to help seize power from the British government. 
In 1601, the Earl of Essex, Robert Devereux, at the age of 35, 
engineered a coup d’état against Queen Elizabeth, hoping to take the 
court, the tower, and the city. One of the main chess pieces in his 
game was Shakespeare, one of his plays, and his company of actors. 
Devereux’s followers convinced them to stage a special performance, 
at the Globe, of Richard II, with the scene of the deposition included. 
The hope was that the play would lead Londoners to riot.  
The actors learned the text again in just a few days – it had been 
dropped off their usual inventory – and indeed staged the play the day 
before the rebellion. But the plot failed miserably. Devereux was 
arrested, tried for treason, and became the last person to lose his head 
at the Tower of London. Part of the incriminating evidence was, 
precisely, his attendance of the performance of Richard II.  
Shakespeare, by contrast, kept his head. And his theatre. How 
and why he came out unharmed of these events is one the many 
enigmas of his life. But it seems beyond doubt that he was an astute 
political operator participating in power plays and intrigues at the 
highest level.  
Be this as it may, these events more importantly show that 
theatre can exert very tangible real-world effects. It does so for 
instance when it stages trials, in particular when they re-try real events 
or public causes. Symbolic resolutions of symbolic disputes can have 
a very real impact on reality. Think of it as inter-sphere-of-justice 
effects: playing out scenes of justice in one sphere of justice – the 
                                                
23 Bryant G. Garth and Yves Dezalay, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial 
Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (Chicago University Press 
1996). See also Thomas Schultz, ‘Celebrating 20 Years of “Dealing in Virtue”’ (2016) 7 
Journal of International Dispute Settlement 531. 
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theatre in general or a given theatre play – can trigger changes in 
understandings and expectations of justice in another sphere of justice 
– ‘the’ real world. 
Theatre also led to specific changes in the relationships between 
states and private regulations and alternative justice in a particular 
context: the resolution of dispute involving authors and publishers.  
The wide popularity of theatre in Shakespeare’s time meant that 
profits could be made, that professional activities could be developed, 
that competitive markets could be established: as Barbara Lauriat puts 
it, ‘[p]laybooks were among the many kinds of books, including 
almanacs, books of hymns, religious texts and poetry that brought 
profits to the booksellers’.24 Manuscripts of plays simply had value, 
both as tangible and as intangible property. This value inevitably 
triggered disputes about them. 
For a long while, and more precisely until 1710, long after 
Shakespeare’s death, these disputes where confined to their own 
private, alternative sphere of justice. The key player at the time was 
the Stationers’ Company, which was something like a guild of 
publishers. These publishers were central to the proto-copyright 
system of the time because they, and not the authors, had exclusive 
rights over the copying of their books. As Lauriat explains, the 
Stationers’ Company had received quasi-complete control over the 
publishing industry from the Crown, in exchange for exercising 
censorship on its behalf – the prohibition of certain books had become 
terribly important for the Crown in the middle of the 16th century, 
when Henry VIII was designated head of the Church of England and 
needed to suppress material that had newly become heretical.25 The 
power of the Company came from the fact that no book could legally 
be printed if it had not been licensed by it and entered in its register.  
The Stationers’ Company had its own private court, which had 
the power to resolve disputes among its members, including the 
infringement by one publisher of the ‘copyright’ of another. Its court 
was powerful: it could of course impose fines, but it even arranged, 
through connections and influence, the imprisonment of some of its 
                                                
24 Barbaria Lauriat, ‘ Literary and Dramatic Disputes in Shakespeare’s Time’ 9 Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement xxx (2018), xxx [page 5 in PAP]. 
25 ibid, xxx [page 3 in PAP]. 
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repeat offenders.26 And when there was a conflict between the ‘law’ of 
the Company and the law of the Crown, the former at least sometimes 
seems to have trumped the latter: Lauriat reports of views held at the 
time about ‘the injustice of a system that elevated the rights of the 
stationers [i.e., the publishers] above those of the authors and even, 
[some] claimed, of the Crown’.27 Coming to the close of her analysis 
of this arrangement, Lauriat concludes that there were ‘overlapping, 
quasi-legal systems of ownership of dramatic works in Shakespeare’s 
time’.28 
It all ended though in 1710, with the enactment of the Statute of 
Anne: Britain’s and probably the world’s first copyright act.29 It 
transferred much power from the publishers to the authors and thus 
concluded the near-exclusive control over the industry that the 
Stationers’ Company had enjoyed until then. It may be surprising to 
us, academics in the 21st century obsessed with authorship, but 
Shakespeare’s early plays were published without attribution. His 
name did not appear on the title page until he was already close to the 
height of his career, writing The Merchant of Venice and about to 
become the owner with his company of the Globe Theatre.30  At any 
rate, the effect of the Statute of Anne, as Lauriat puts it, was that ‘the 
period of self-regulation with its internal system of resolving disputes 
between those involved in the book trade had ended. Copyright was 
now a matter to be thrashed out in the courts’ – meaning in state 
courts, outside of the previous alternative sphere of justice.31 
The post-1710 system ushered in a new era for authors, a much 
clearer system of copyright protection roughly similar to what we 
have today, state controlled, with less obvious alternative spheres of 
justice. On whether this is a good thing, Lauriat has this to say: noting 
the correlation between the sharp decline of English theatre and the 
maturing of the copyright system, she concludes that ‘[w]hile no 
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doubt fairer to authors en masse, the one-size-fits-all approach of 
modern copyright is not necessarily the sole or best way to produce a 
concentration of works of enduring genius.’32 Might there be a 
connection between the plurality of spheres of justice and creativity, 
be it only because of the need to switch between multiple universes of 
references and ways of thinking? It does not seem implausible.  
 
 
2. Shakespearean Legal Themes 
 
A vast array of legal themes traverse Shakespeare’s work. It is almost 
as if whenever we lawyers come up with a new theme, there is 
something, somewhere, in Shakespeare that helps us think about it. If 
his purpose was to use the theatrical scene as a mirror for his 
contemporary society to represent itself and understand itself, he has 
succeeded far beyond his aim: certainly we as actors of the life of the 
law, today, still have many revealing reflections to see in his work. 
Some of these reflections are analytically illuminating. Others 
are truly cathartic, and humbling. Many suggest how much we still 
live in the same collective legal imagination as we did in 
Shakespeare’s time. This is remarkable because it is that collective 
imagination which is the true ultimate foundation of law, not some 
legal doctrine or theory. We are still very much part of the same legal 
‘narrative community’, as Michael Sandel would put it.33 We tell 
ourselves many of the same social-historical stories, which we take for 
truths instead of the creations of our own society that they really are.34 
Truths on which we build our identities and, on these identities, the 
themes of our legal understandings.  
We should begin with what is a rather self-evident theme in a 
law & theatre approach: the role of masks. (The fact that ‘masques’ 
were a very popular form of partying in the English Inns of Court in 
the 16th and 17th century, used to express the values of law and the 
joys of the legal profession, is not the only reason that makes it a self-
                                                
32 ibid, xxx-xxx. (13 in PAP) 
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(Harvard University Press 1996). 
34 Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society ((MIT Press 1987). 
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evident theme.35) Now granted, judges and advocates wear wigs and 
gowns in some jurisdictions, not quite masks. At least not in the 
physical, material sense. But metaphorically, law is no doubt very 
much a matter of masks – at least in the narrative community we 
commonly inhabit. 
At the most basic level, one of the very tasks of law is to serve as 
a language into which we translate our situations, our disputes. Law 
grants linguistic hospitality to our complex, contradictory, uncertain 
world.36 But of course law does not quite allow us to fully apprehend 
any reality. No translation does. No language could. In that sense, law 
can be seen as a mask we put on reality, emphasizing some of its 
traits, hiding others, retaining a version of the phenomenon to be 
accounted for which could easily be swapped for another. Remember 
Hegel: ‘The first act by which Adam established his lordship over the 
animals is this, that he gave them a name, ie, he nullified them as 
beings on their own account.’37 Phenomenologists would probably 
concur: we have no direct access to reality; reality always comes 
masked; law is one such mask. Reality wears that particular mask for 
certain special occasions.  
Let us take this general point about masks one step further, into 
the realm of international dispute settlement. Now notice the array of 
international disputes submitted to international courts and tribunals 
with the only real purpose of removing them from the realm of 
political responsibility of the actors involved. Interstate disputes 
would be the most typical occurrence.38 Such disputes are out of 
political hands when they are in the hands of an international tribunal. 
The parties – taken not as legal entities but as actual individuals with 
lives and personal interests – distance themselves from governance 
responsibilities, or other problem-solving responsibilities, by setting in 
motion the theatricalities of the trial. These theatricalities then follow 
their own dynamics. Think of the litigation of such disputes as a stage, 
                                                
35 Martin Butler, ‘The Legal Masque: Humanity and Liberty at the Inns of Court’ in Lorna 
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with actors (the parties) wearing masks of concern for their 
constituencies, when they really mean a different, and not necessarily 
worse, realpolitik.  
Within a trial, masks of course also play a role. Their purpose is 
no longer to create the entire representation, the play. It is not to make 
the trial exist, as a proxy or placeholder for something else. The 
purpose of the masks is here rather to assign roles within the trial. In 
theatre, assigning clear roles to the characters of a play, clarifying the 
assignation of these roles, is one of the key functions of masks. This 
was so in particular in classical Greek theatre, where the use of masks 
was central to the very idea of theatre as a form of art, transforming 
the actors into their characters.39 After all, the Greek word for masks is 
‘persona’. (So much for our personalities.) It is also a key role of law 
to assign clear roles to the parties within a trial, for the purposes of the 
trial and beyond: when one party is made to wear the mask of the 
perpetrator, the other that of the victim, this matters both for the trial 
itself and, through a cathartic process, it serves to reaffirm rules, 
values and their corresponding roles, for society at large.  
Even a court itself sometimes wears a mask to perform a 
particular role for a particular audience. A court may indeed wish to 
present what it does in a particular way, perhaps even disguise it. It 
may transpose its voice, for instance in order to please a particular 
audience. The International Court of Justice has been shown to go to 
quite great lengths in trying to please states and their representatives.40 
The perceived legitimacy and use of the ICJ was historically 
something that the Court had to fight for and progressively earn.41 
Now it is something it has to defend in order to keep. To defend it, the 
Court has to remain appealing to states, because everything depends 
on their goodwill, on the readiness of states to use the Court. To be 
appealing to states, the Court uses a certain language, presents its 
decisions in a certain way, takes on a certain guise. It wears a mask it 
hopes states will find alluring.  
                                                
39 David Wiles, Mask and Performance in Greek Tragedy (CUP 2007). 
40 Andrea Bianchi, ‘Gazing at the Crystal Ball (again): State Immunity and Jus Cogens 
beyond Germany v Italy’, 4 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 457 (2013), 474. 
41 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The International Court as a World Court’, in Vaughan Lowe & 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in 
Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (CUP 1996) 3, 6-7. 
20 
 
Even this laconically selective survey already reveals several 
roles for masks in law. Masks are worn by the parties to make trials 
exist; the law assigns masks to the actors of the trial; and courts 
themselves wear masks. Trials, in truth, are very much a masked 
affair. 
It is then unsurprising that Shakespeare’s most famous trial 
scene, in The Merchant of Venice, takes place in Venice, the city of 
masks par excellence. In the play’s representation of Venice, it is as if 
carnival had become second nature to everyone involved. Travestying 
is routine, concealment the order of the day. Masks, in their 
ambivalence, incarnate truth in Venice. They enable everyone to take 
on shifting incognitos. Everybody is an actor. The masks grant a 
release from conventions of social behavior. They give free rein to 
audacity. They allow all forms of excess under the reassuring 
protection that it is all a game. A game of shadows. A game of masks.  
By exaggerating the traits of the masks used in the play – by 
performing a masquerade of masks, if you will – Shakespeare invites 
the audience to look beyond the masks. The entire play acts as a lie 
detector of sorts, trying to bring out some veracity from behind the 
appearances, some justice from behind the legal. But it also exhibits 
certain vile social-historical stories behind appearances of justice: 
antisemitism against Shylock the outcast Jewish moneylender. It 
brings to light the untruth of simple views on the relationship between 
justice and black letter legalism: mercy is invoked to prevent an 
injustice, only to create another, as is strict insistence on the letter of 
the contract. And it shows the duplicity that law sometimes resorts to 
in order to achieve justice: saving Antonio’s life by travestying Portia 
as Balthazar, the accused’s friend’s lover as the neutral legal expert, 
which is the play’s ultimate mask. 
The Merchant of Venice also displays the perils of the extremes 
in the use of masks. Shylock, at one extreme, is the only character that 
appears to wear no mask – or at least just one mask, the one thrust on 
him by the Christians, the hard, cold, mechanistic Jewish ‘other’. His 
utterances require no interpretation. He says what he thinks and thinks 
what he says. His language is straightforward, direct, precise, 
repetitive. But of course his intransigency, his masklessness, will 
eventually backfire and be his demise. Yet at precisely that moment 
we also understand that his single-mindedness is itself really a mask 
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hiding the complexities of his sentiments. When he shows emotions, 
even passion (‘I crave the law’, he says), his mask flies off his face 
and we feel compassion and solicitude for this fallible, vulnerable 
man. As if the absence of a mask is a mask itself, awkwardly trying to 
hide the multiple, frail, what-ifs of our identities – starting with this 
endless query: ‘what if I were the “other”?’. 
For the Venetians, at the other extreme, only appearances count. 
People promise the world and then compromise themselves. They 
commit themselves and then commit perjury. They get involved and 
then evolve. One’s word, as all the rest, is light and easy to give, 
inconstant and characterless. Nothing must stand in the way of the 
mondaine ballet of conversation. The irony in the story is that it is 
Portia, one of the Venetians’ own, who will eventually lecture them 
about the importance of promises and truthfulness – but only after she 
has herself used masks to compromise promises and truthfulness. In 
Act V, she admonishes Bassanio, who has just ‘sw[orn] to thee, even 
by thine own fair eyes’: ‘Mark you but that! / In both my eyes he 
doubly sees himself; / In each eye, one: swear by your double self, / 
And there's an oath of credit.’ Bassanio, of course, does not learn a 
thing, and immediately swears again: ‘Nay, but hear me: / Pardon this 
fault, and by my soul I swear / I never more will break an oath with 
thee.’ Then again the extent of the promise, this time, is clarified by 
his friend Antonio, who explains that Bassanio ‘Will never more 
break faith advisedly.’  
Portia herself is not innocent. What she blames Bassanio for is 
that he cannot produce their betrothal ring, which he had promised 
never to relinquish. But of course it is Portia herself, masked as 
Balthazar, who made Bassanio part with the ring, when she requested 
it as a token of appreciation for saving Antonio’s life. Moreover, when 
she lectures Bassanio, Portia uses one of Shylock’s own key 
arguments: the connection between the word given and the flesh itself. 
She refers to the ring with the following language: ‘A thing stuck on 
with oaths upon your finger / And so riveted with faith unto your 
flesh.’ At this point, is Portia sincere or is she rather taking the whole 
masquerade to an extreme?  
Ian Ward takes us to another play to elaborate on the role of 
masks as a Shakespearean legal theme: Henry VIII. As Ward 
immediately points out, what characterises the play is that ‘In all the 
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other histories, there are lots of soldiers and lots of battles. There are 
none in Henry VIII. In place of war there is law.’42 Would masks have 
something to do with it? The subtitle of the play, All is True, suggests 
as much. 
The play revolves around a central ‘trial’: the Legatine Court 
established to deal with Henry’s divorce from Katherine of Aragon. 
The point for Henry was to get Anne Boleyn. She was available and 
attractive. He wanted to have her. At any cost, be the cost the 
Reformation and the establishment of the Anglican Church and 
profound alterations in the English constitution. There are also 
smaller, satellite trials in Henry VIII. In fact, there are particularly 
many trials in the play. All seem to bring up ‘questions of veracity and 
judgment.’43 In the end, the play is really all about ‘judgement and its 
disappointments.’44 And disappointments point to expectations. 
Of disappointments with trials, judgments, and lawyers, there are 
a good deal in the play. First there are the trials of the Duke of 
Buckingham and of Cardinal Wolsey. The former is arrested on 
frivolous charges of treason, arranged by the latter. But soon Wolsey 
gets it in turn: initially Henry’s favourite, he eventually falls in 
disgrace and is accused of trumped up charges of illegal involvement 
from foreign courts with England’s affairs, stripped of his seal and his 
lands and banished from Council. As Ward puts it, these two trials are 
simply ‘travesties of justice, if not legal form.’45  
Then there is of course the Legatine Court itself.46 A court 
engineered by the plotting Cardinal. A court of which Wolsey is 
‘enamoured’.47 A court which is at the centre of the play because the 
entire play is really about Wolsey, not Henry. It is about the 
Cardinal’s ‘vaulting ambition’, and about the instrument of his 
ambition – the court.48 A court which does not resolve anything, 
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except eventually leading England to set up its own Church and to 
break with Rome, all because of an emotionally unstable king in 
search of manhood (Brexiteers have invented nothing). A court that 
was not meant to resolve anything; but as Ward reminds us, 
‘Shakespearean lawyers rarely resolve anything much’ anyway.49 A 
court that was not meant to be impartial either, but only to mask 
Wolsey’s political machinations and self-advancement.50 All is True, 
really? 
King Henry VIII is not much different himself. His role in his 
own trial is ambivalent.51 Formally he is of course no judge, but ‘sat 
beneath his “cloth of state” it is only too apparent that he is there to 
judge. And he is quick to intervene, to “spare that time” and move 
things on.’52 His ambivalence – or is it a dialectic relation? – generally 
extends to truth and masks.53 On the one hand he ‘rails against the 
entire proceeding, the ‘dilatory sloth and tricks of Rome”’.54 On the 
other hand ‘nothing Henry says is quite what it seems’, he repeatedly 
self-fashions himself, he ‘perform[s] in masques’, ‘hide[s] behind 
curtains “reading pensively” or simply spyi[es] on others’.55 All in all 
Henry ‘cuts through the pretence, and yet is so obviously defined by 
it.’56 A masked man in pretended search for simplicity in a trial. All is 
True, really? 
Yes, really, suggests the Prologue: but a ‘chosen truth’ (Prol.18). 
A truth unconcerned with historiography.57 A truth about complex 
relationships.  
First the relationships between masks and justice: the trial itself 
would not have taken place but for Wolsey’s pretences, yet it is 
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Wolsey’s ‘witchcraft’ in language which eventually precipitates his 
own fall.58 Wolsey, whose ‘oral signature in the play’, as Lynne 
Magnusson puts it, is a ‘curious hybrid of deference and self-
aggrandizement’.59 
Then the relationships between the theatricality of justice and the 
irresolution of matters not really meant to be resolved: Shakespearean 
trials rarely inspire confidence and his judges often fail to reach 
judgment, but theatricality may well be the end and not the means, 
both in the plays and in real trials.  
And finally the relationships between reaching judgment and our 
expectations of trials: ‘the theatricality militates against the pretences 
of […] jurisprudential “truth”’,60 Ward tells us.  
Law itself, and trials in particular, are a mask of truth – a 
‘chosen truth’, in the words of Shakespeare’s prologue. A ‘mask of 
truth’: odd choice of words, perhaps. But it alerts us lawyers to the 
idea that a trial, the resolution of a legal question, does not always 
correspond to, may be neither cause nor consequence of the resolution 
of, a real question. Certain things are simply not meant to be resolved, 
certain questions not answered. Yet appearances count: they constitute 
a truth of their own. When dispute resolution procedures achieve 
irresolution, as in the play, it may be a resolution of appearances. The 
achievement, the resolution simply takes place at another level. 
And if answers to legal questions write a story, or indeed history, 
the story is just a ‘chosen’ story, a ‘chosen’ history, which could have 
been written very differently. The whole idea of Henry VIII suggests 
as much: it is to ‘reconvene[…] the Legatine Court so that it might 
consider the case for an appeal; and the audience will serve as his 
jury’,61 undoubtedly with the implicit point that each audience will be 
different, would write the story, and history, differently.  
So legal questions are masked questions. But they certainly 
come with a pretence of truth. A trial then becomes a theatrical ‘doing 
as if’, which makes it possible to overcome many difficulties which 
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would stand in the way of resolution in the perspective of other chosen 
truths. Remember Hegel again: ‘The first act by which Adam 
established his lordship over the animals is this, that he gave them a 
name, ie, he nullified them as beings on their own account.’62 A name 
is a mask. And naming is opting for a given chosen truth. A theatrical 
‘doing as if’ is the same. It may resolve a chosen question within a 
chosen truth. Sometimes this may be quite enough. Sometimes it does 
not really resolve anything. 
From masks we easily move to authority. At the simplest level, 
both relate to roles, and connect to it from different perspectives. One 
is more a cause than a consequence of a role. The other more a 
consequence than a cause. As Fuad Zarbiyev puts it, ‘authority can be 
described as a mode of regulating behaviour. … An authoritative 
utterance determines behaviour not because of a threat of sanction (or 
a promise of a reward), or through persuasion, but because it emanates 
from a particular person.’63 In the language of the analysis conducted 
here, we would say that an utterance is authoritative because it 
emanates from ‘a particular person wearing a particular mask’, in 
other words a particular character. Zarbiyev would call such masks 
marks of deference-entitling properties.64 A mask causes a role which 
causes authority. As we will see in a moment, it is a socially 
sanctioned mask.  
If meanwhile we take the analysis one step further, it is not 
difficult to see that masks and authority relate to a form of desire: 
desire to be perceived in a certain way, desire to be respected, and 
obeyed. Both are also associated with rituals: the rituals of going 
through the motions of the role ascribed by the mask and thus 
reinforcing both the role and the mask, the rituals of procedurally 
complying with the marks of authority. And both have a bearing on 
language: masks alter voices both physically and metaphorically, 
authority creates voice. To be sure, both masks and authority are 
central to law.  
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Maria Aristodemou substantially thickens that simple analysis, 
through a novel examination of Hamlet – of all plays.65 Hamlet is said 
to be the one play about which the greatest number of critical analyses 
have been written.66 The one Shakespeare play everyone can quote six 
words from. Nevertheless Aristodemou offers an inventing discussion 
of it, based on a psychoanalytical, principally Lacanian perspective. 
One that, precisely, connects it to law, desire, authority, and language.  
Recall the plot: Hamlet, the prince of Denmark, hears from his 
father’s ghost that the previous king, indeed his father, was killed by 
Uncle Claudius who wanted and got both his throne and his wife – 
Hamlet’s mother, then. Upon learning this, Hamlet rushes into 
inaction. He spends most of the play moaning, trying to decide what to 
do about the whole affair, drives the woman who loves him to suicide, 
alternately berates and comes on to the queen his mother, and in the 
end everybody dies. Hamlet is about many things, but almost 
everyone agrees that it revolves around Hamlet’s Oedipal relationship 
with his mother.67 And that is indeed Aristodemou’s point of entry into 
the play.  
Hamlet, Aristodemou argues, is very much about law, incarnated 
by his dead father (pun intended). She puts it thus: ‘Rather than 
mourning for King Hamlet [the father], we can see Hamlet as resentful 
and anxious of the fact that his father’s death has left him ‘too close’ 
to the maternal object. Without the intervening agent of the father to 
regulate his desire in accordance with the law, Hamlet finds himself 
too close to Gertrude [his mother] who, as Claudius puts it, “lives by 
his looks”’.68 Hamlet then, as a good Oedipal subject, wants his 
mother but also wants to be prevented from wanting, wants that his 
Oedipal wanting be repressed. This is where the law – that is, the 
father – should have come in. But of course it/he is dead. Its/his 
absence leaves Hamlet paralysed, in action.  
Law, then, is a mechanism of repression, a desirable mechanism 
of repression of desires. For if we repress the mechanism of 
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repression, Aristodemou continues, what happens is that we are left 
with the belief that ‘[e]ven our repression is not good enough as there 
is no higher law to authorize the ‘quality’ of our repression. Hamlet’, 
the author goes on, ‘is perhaps the first literary representation of the 
modern depressive subject, depressed because even his repression of 
his desire is not good enough.’69  
In other words, the absence of law, the absence of repression, 
leads to depression, which is the absence of desire. A dilution of law, 
then, far from being liberating, would rather cause inaction (a lack of 
desire), or at best random provocation: ‘There is no more effective 
way of ensuring the law’s existence than to keep provoking it into 
proving its very being.’70 From that perspective, we can see this about 
the role of the law: law is there to regulate desire and, by regulating it, 
it makes room for it. Law arouses desire by repressing it. 
For international lawyers, this may well translate into a call to 
oppose the dilution of international law, for instance in the form of a 
sweeping recognition of informal international law as international 
law.71 If ‘everything’ is law, not only do we risk losing all sense of 
what it is.72 We also risk losing its desire-regulating and thus desire-
arousing function, which is material at the granular, atomic, 
interpersonal level of all sorts of international affairs (pun again 
intended). If this is true, and if the actors of international commerce 
for instance are individuals who normally have desires, then the 
absence of this function of law would lead, at the end of the chain of 
consequences, to a depressed state of international commerce. Put 
simply, if a pseudo Lacanian-father authority is attached to a too wide 
array of norms, that authority is effectively diluted and loses its 
repressive function. And the loss of its repressive function kills action 
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instead of triggering it. Or brutally simplified: too many rules, all of 
which are quite soft, hampers initiative.73 
Another point of interest in the play, Aristodemou further 
argues, is what it tells us about rituals and authority and how truths are 
best uttered. First of all, for Shakespeare rituals are a defining element 
of humanity, they ‘are essential to mark man from animal’.74 Hamlet 
asks indeed this: ‘What is a man,/ If his chief good and market of his 
time/Be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more.’75 Aristodemou 
explains it thus: ‘It is the extra expenditure, the surplus, and even 
superfluous, forms and rituals that mark the distinction between 
humanity and animality; neglecting them, Shakespeare suggests, is to 
regress to a beastly existence.’76 We are human because many of the 
things we do are not material in attaining the immediate object of our 
actions. We are human because we inhabit a symbolic world. 
The function of rituals in the context of authority considered 
through Hamlet is to fill the gap between the king’s two bodies, and 
thus to reinforce the authority of the physical king through the 
authority of his symbolic counterpart. Aristodemou puts it thus: ‘The 
rituals and insignia surrounding monarchy help fill the distance 
between the two bodies: monarchy as a political system uses the King 
as a figurehead that […] is structurally necessary to close the 
system.’77  
Rituals make us grant authority because we see others, real or 
symbolic others, grant authority. We believe – in authority, in 
legitimate exercise of power, in the obligation to obey – because 
someone else believes: ‘Rituals foster a belief in the system, a belief 
which, like all beliefs, functions vicariously and from a distance: we 
believe because we believe someone else believes, and functions as 
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the guarantor of our faith.’78 Or as Zarbiyev puts it, ‘Authority does 
not rest on individual choices, but on “a belief system” that socially 
sanctions it.’79 (Hence the socially sanctioned mask from above.) ‘If 
the collective belief system supporting authority within a community 
disappears’, Zarbiyev continues, ‘authority itself will disappear’.80 We 
believe because of a belief system. We believe because others believe. 
Anyone’s authority rests on our collective and thus individual belief in 
it, constantly refuelled by rituals around it. 
The idea applies in full in international dispute settlement. The 
international judiciary, and the sundry judges and arbitrators that 
constitute it, have two bodies too. One is politic and one is natural. 
There is the function and there are the women and men who inhabit it. 
Here too the various court rituals and the business rituals in arbitration 
serve to ground the authority of the natural, physical women and men 
in the authority of ‘the’ judge and ‘the’ arbitrator. We obey judges and 
arbitrators principally because of rituals. They symbolically create the 
function of the judge and the arbitrator, and make us believe that 
others obey them because they too follow the rituals. We obey them 
only secondarily because of any authority inherent in the personal 
traits of the judges and arbitrators as natural people or because of any 
real threat of a sanction. Even a pathetic judge or arbitrator is granted 
authority. The rituals close or reduce the gap between the king’s, the 
judge’s, and the arbitrator’s two bodies. 
Now Hamlet precisely forces this gap open. Hamlet, in that 
sense, really is an attack on monarchy. Hamlet’s soliloquies, 
Aristodemou suggests, reveal the distance between the two bodies of 
the king, between the ‘symbolic role of King and the pathetic person 
it’s attached to’.81 The gap is forced open by Hamlet’s reminder, ‘in 
the graveyard scene, that the King, after all, is a mortal man like the 
rest of us’.82 This reminder draws attention ‘to the gap between the (all 
too human, if not pathetic) person occupying the office of King and 
the symbolic role’.83 
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Clearly, as in any other area of human activity, not every 
member of the international judiciary is the opposite of pathetic. This 
is not a particularism of our time. It was so in the past and will be so 
in all credible futures. Not everyone is not a sham. Not everybody 
should be granted the authority that comes with the role through the 
catalyst of the rituals. But how to expose the sham? Surely not by 
engaging in a soliloquy with a skull in a courtroom? 
Well, this would not be so far off. Not quite with a real skull of 
course. Shakespeare, Aristodemou explains, can safely do this, he can 
safely re-examine monarchy at a stone’s throw from the monarch, he 
can safely touch on the touchiest subjects, he can proceed, as Lacan 
would say, on the path ‘toward conquest of the truth’, because he 
presents it as being on ‘the path of deception’.84 By portraying himself 
as mad, by disguising himself as a madman, by concealing what he 
really means under what Freud suggests is an intended ‘cloak of wit 
and unintelligibility’,85 he can make real progress. Appear crazy or 
farcical and your utterances of inconvenient truths will be condoned. 
Exaggerate and you will be tolerated. Notice that this was the very 
role of court jesters. 
Certain judges and arbitrators have long understood this. Some 
of the greatest jurisprudential progresses have been achieved through 
outlandish or unintelligibly presented or even witty arguments, often 
under the guise of unimportance, in obiter dicta. The truth here simply 
seems to be that, to say the truth, for instance to expose shams, gaps 
between authority granted and authority deserved, one might need to 
say it in a seemingly untrue manner.  
The theme of the authority of the international judiciary and 
arbitrators should briefly take us back to Henry VIII and Cardinal 
Wolsey. We might recall that Ward pointed out how Wolsey was 
devoured by ambition, and how his ambitions did no good to the trials 
he was involved in.86  
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Now, Joost Pauwelyn conducted an empirical study comparing 
World Trade Organisation panellists (WTO ‘judges’) and investment 
arbitrators.87 The broader theme of his study was the stark difference 
between the respective levels of societal criticism these systems of 
dispute settlement are facing – remarkably light with regard to WTO 
dispute settlement,88 conspicuously heavy in investment arbitration89. 
The rules of the two systems are of course largely distinct, but he 
surmised that who decides the disputes is also part of the problem.  
What is curious, he seemed to think, is that it is generally 
understood that to get the rule of law, understood as a societally 
accepted system of governance, you need the rule of lawyers, 
understood as the dominance of high-flying lawyers.90 Yet precisely, 
his study showed, WTO panellists are ‘“Faceless Bureaucrats”’, 
‘diplomats or ex-diplomats, often without a law degree and mostly 
with relatively little experience’, while investment arbitrators are 
‘“Star Arbitrators”’, ‘high-powered, elite jurists with a much deeper 
level of expertise and experience as compared to the average WTO 
panelist’. To the point that they are ‘“from different planets”’.91  
How come? How is it possible, he asked, that ‘a regime with 
adjudicators that ostensibly have less expertise and experience (WTO 
dispute settlement) can outshine a regime (ISDS) with, on its face, 
higher-quality decision-makers’?92 For Pauwelyn, the puzzle is all 
about a lack of ‘“voice” and political participation’ in investment 
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arbitration: the pool of investment arbitrators is simply not 
representative and inclusive enough, and this weighs more heavily 
than the difference in levels of expertise.93  
Fair enough. But from a Shakespearean perspective, one cannot 
but think of another hypothesis: a possible link between the respective 
ambitions of these two groups of dispute resolvers and the respective 
levels of societal criticism. Can some investment arbitrators be likened 
to Cardinal Wolsey? Does their ‘vaulting ambition’ do any good to the 
system?  
Is reliance on 17th century literature enough of a cloak of wit and 
unintelligibility to even querstion this? Does it take a law & literature 
approach with its repertoire of metaphors, indirectness, cloaks of wit 
and apparent unintelligibility, to ask such sensitive questions and 
investigate such unpopular hypotheses? Could studies as brilliant as 
Pauwelyn’s become even more illuminating with the addition of the 
fuzzy logics of a law & literature method? 
Let us leave aside the fervour and the ardour that such questions 
would inevitably trigger, and turn more squarely to the role of passion 
in the settlement of international disputes, and in the creation of such 
disputes.  
Gary Watt takes up the theme through the lens of King John.94 
He applies it to the example of Brexit – sadly the already classic 
example of excitement against rationality. ‘In King John’, Watt says, 
‘we sense that Shakespeare is speaking very directly to the same 
passions that have arisen in the Brexit dispute’.95  
Yes, undoubtedly, Brexit is an entirely irrational thing to do. But 
it obeys death-seeking passions, just like many other forms of self-
destructive behavior, aggregated here at the national level. As we 
know, such forms of behavior are often an attempt to use drama to 
solicit attention and help. These in turn makes drama aesthetically 
pleasing because attention and help, ultimately, evolutionarily, are 
good for survival. In a sense then, we are genetically coded for drama. 
In a sense then, Brexit can be viewed as something like a purposefully 
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failed suicide attempt: a call for help from individuals with certain 
characteristics.  
For Watt the story is understandably more complex. There are 
three reasons that played out in the Brexit referendum, he argues: 
arguments about ‘who should have power over the people’, argument 
about ‘personal and national economic well-being’, and arguments 
grounded in ‘illegitimate prejudice and xenophobia’.96 And the whole 
thing of course only materialized because of a misjudgment of the 
respective strengths of these factors in the decision-making of voters: 
more precisely, he  points out, ‘[u]nderlying the miscalculation of the 
public mood was a dangerous failure to appreciate how great a sense 
of human worth is generated by the power to exercise a dramatic act 
of self-determination.’97  
The passions triggered by ‘home-nation sovereignty’ were 
underestimated.98 It is irrelevant to these passions that nations are 
‘imagined communities’.99 That they are the socially constructed 
equation between a dominant community and a territory.100 That they 
are creatures initially carved into life in a fight against feudal lords, 
the Church, and local customs. It makes no difference, or rather not 
enough difference yet, that transnational communities are on the rise, 
distant echoes of pre-nation-state collective life.101 As Watt puts it, just 
like the citizens of Angiers in King John when they are asked ‘Whose 
title they admit, Arthur’s or John’s’,102 in other words when a rather 
inconsequential town is asked who should be king, certain people 
‘found pleasure in the fleeting power of their own political supremacy 
and seized the moment eagerly.’103 
Shakespeare and law, in the end, may be seen as having a 
dialectical relationship with passion. On the one hand, the masquerade 
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of law, discussed above, helps translate the story at hand into a less 
passionate version so that it becomes easier to deal with rationally. On 
the other hand, law, and perhaps in particular the settlement of 
international disputes, needs to take such logics into account. Watt 
remarks that King John puts it thus in the play, ‘This might have been 
prevented and made whole / With very easy arguments of love’.104 The 
role of the law in the resolution of disputes, then, may well often be to 
turn death-seeking passions and logics of death into logics of life.105 
This idea of law’s pursuit of logics of life comes nicely into play 
in Measure for Measure. An imaginary Vienna grapples with a 
somewhat unhealthy degree of licentiousness. The good Duke ruling 
over the city ostensibly departs, leaving the keys to the city to his 
deputy, the zealous and puritanical Angelo. The shift in power is the 
occasion of a reflection on the right measure in law’s enforcement and 
in its reach.  
As soon as he is at the helm, Angelo revives old legislation 
punishing extramarital sex by death. The city’s many brothels are all 
closed in one swift move. Unmarried lovers are driven into deathly 
territories. And then the questions come: Can repression contain sex 
drive? Should it, when it is all consensual? And in the event of an 
offense, should prohibitions be systematically enforced?  
‘Yes’, Angelo responds doggedly to each of these questions. 
Until, as a matter of course, he too succumbs to the guilty inclinations 
he claims to eradicate. He yields to his lust for Isabella, a beautiful 
woman who intends to join a particularly numbing nunnery. He offers 
her mercy for her brother Claudio, who was sentenced to death for 
having sex with his girlfriend. Claudio’s life is his price for her body. 
No deal, she says. 
By temperament Angelo is a heedless slave to the letter of the 
law. But by return of the repressed he is also an anguished slave to his 
own humanity. For this is the human condition: either we embrace our 
humanity and make it our force, or we push it off only to fall in its 
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tormenting thrall, and that is where the problems really start. The law 
is not innocent in pointing us towards one of these two paths. 
But the good Duke had in fact only withdrawn to the shadows of 
another identity for the time required to teach this lesson. And so he 
can now return to recall the virtues of self-restrained justice. His plot 
and Shakespeare’s play are a reductio ad absurdum to show that law’s 
partial ineffectiveness, even if it is criminal law, is indispensable for 
social harmony.  
Then again, the Duke’s departure and Angelo’s intercession 
were justified by the need to rein in the city’s slackness, which in truth 
had become excessive. So the lesson, in typical Shakespearean 
fashion, in typical dialectic perspective, is once again double: no 
community can survive without some degree of reaffirmation of 
common rules, of a common law – a common law that should 
nevertheless be applied in moderation. 
Notice, then, the deeper legal theme of the play. It is what 
appears right on the surface of its title: it is about measure.  
Measure, as opposed to Angelo’s immeasurable rigour in the 
application of law, the immeasurable harshness of Claudio’s 
punishment, the immeasurable insistence of Isabella in safeguarding 
chasteness in the face of her brother’s death, the immeasurable cycle 
of violence which would be caused by a tit-for-tat approach.106  
Some degree of ineffectiveness in law is required. But it is also 
inappropriate for law to regulate certain aspects of life. And if it really 
must, it should not systematically punish transgressions driven by 
human nature. Then again, it better be a form of ineffectiveness that 
falls short of the Duke’s immeasurable laxness.  
In the play, Escalus incarnates that idea. Escalus, whose name 
evokes scales. Who serves as the Duke’s aged and trusted advisor. 
Who is lauded by the Duke from Act 1 Scene 1. Who is left second in 
command to Angelo. Whose role is to try to thwart Angelo’s over- 
                                                
106 Driving tit-for-tat approaches ad absurdum is a recurring theme in Shakespearean legal 
thought: see for instance Kenji Yoshino, ‘Revenge as Revenant: Titus Andronicus and the 
Rule of Law’ 21 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 203 (2009). 
36 
 
determination to a draconian enforcement of the rules. Escalus, who 
incarnates an Aristotelian model of ‘reasonable’ justice.107 
More generally, law is a form of measure in at least four ways. It 
is a set of measures (rules, sanctions). It is an instrument of measure 
the way scales are, settings proportions to human relationships. It is 
the expression of an appropriate middle ground, aiming at an 
equilibrium and at moderation. And it institutionalizes a weights and 
measures system for marking the appropriate paces of social 
relationships, bringing to the surface the variegated types of salient 
moments in communal life108 – salient moments which in turn shape 
law’s own identity.109  
Following from the idea of weights and measures, the play is 
also about measure in the market or trade sense: is everything 
tradable, and if so at what price? Isabella’s chasteness for Claudio’s 
life? Mariana’s body for Isabella’s? The idea of prostitution, and its 
right price if it has any, undergirds the entire play. And again on law’s 
retributive and compensatory role: must there really be pay back for 
every crime, every harm illegally caused, and if so how is it to be 
measured?  
The play ultimately expresses the need for law to remain 
humane, that it must acknowledge that it deals with human beings. It 
must not be a system which is merely content to seek internal 
perfection and makeshift legitimation in self-injected 
constitutionalization. Law, lawyers, and legal scholars are there to 
serve men and women in communal life – not the reverse, where the 
aesthetic satisfaction of a neatly logical system becomes the altar at 
which lives are sacrificed. The play denounces our presumptuous folly 
in seeking law’s purity.   
All this makes the play particularly suited for educational 
purposes. Lorenzo Zucca and Lord Judge offer an example of how 
wonderfully Measure for Measure can and has been used as the basis 
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of a mock trial for undergraduate students. As they put it, it is perfect 
instructional material for students interested in dispute settlement as it 
allows them to ‘pinpoint the values in tension in the real life of the 
law’, to blow on the ‘waves that curl the flat, cool covers of the law 
books.’110  
Translated into current legal concepts, the play is about 
proportionality. It thus addresses a particularly significant theme in 
international dispute settlement, especially in investment arbitration111 
and in WTO law,112 although proportionality is also more broadly a 
matter of attention for global governance113 and international law.114 
But it is important to note the play tells a story about a form of 
proportionality which is more than simply putting the cursor in the 
middle of a one-dimensional continuum, a midway point on a one-
dimensional measurement. It is not a zero-sum game where one side’s 
gain is necessarily the other side’s loss.  
It rather is a form of proportionality infused by dialectics, by the 
idea that the realization of one set of interests can passes over into and 
be preserved and fulfilled by an opposite set of interests. It is in 
essence a Hegelian type of the legal principle.115   
Measure for Measure asks us, then, to be creative in dealing 
with seemingly opposite values, opposite legal objectives, opposite 
interests. And it certainly asks us to avoid the immeasure of single-
mindedness. For example the single-mindedness of certain investment 
arbitrators insisting that the world needs a strong hand to protect 
investors, that investment arbitration is that hand, and the stronger the 
                                                
110 Lorenzo Zucca and Lord Judge, ‘Measure for Measure on Trial—A Shakespearean Mock 
Trial’ 9 Journal of International Dispute Settlement xxx (2018), xxx [p 1 of PAP] 
111 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier’ 4 Law & 
Ethics of Human Rights 48 (2010); Erlend M. Leonhardsen, ‘Looking for Legitimacy: 
Exploring Proportionality Analysis in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ 3 Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement 95 (2012). 
112 Andrew Mitchell, ‘Proportionality and Remedies in WTO Disputes’ 17 European 
Journal of International Law 985 (2006). 
113 Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism’ 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 72 (2008). 
114 Thomas Franck, ‘Proportionality in International Law’ 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 
231 (2010). 
115 Milena Korycka-Zirk, ‘The Legal Principle of Proportionality in the Light of Hegel’s 
Legal Philosophy’ Hegel-Jahrbuch 271 (2014). 
38 
 
hand the better.116 This view effectively turns investment arbitration 
into one more instrument of the global economic straightjacket that 
international political economy scholars tend to consider warily.117 Or 
the single-mindedness of those who embrace legal certainty 
unqualifiedly in international dispute settlement, thinking it 
necessarily is a moral-political positive.118 But of course also the 
single-mindedness of those who believe just in the opposite. And, if 
we keep dialectics in mind, the single-mindedness of those who 
consider that the right solution is simply somewhere in the middle.  
These dialectics, in their intent on creativity and in their 
elementary grounding in human reasonableness, are perhaps the most 
fundamental of all logics of life. In law, in theatre, and in many other 
areas of human thought. Dialectics are possibly law’s most important 
anchor in humanity, allowing law to reach its greatest degree of 
civilization. The fact that they inscribe themselves as an oxymoronic 
subtitle to a literal reading of the title’s play – the deathly cycle of tit-
for-tat, measure-for-measure approaches – is once again very 
Shakespearean. It is very dialectic. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
And so we are back, surreptitiously, to the theme this article began 
with: we do not want to be able to ‘think about something that is 
inextricably connected with something else, without thinking about 
the something else’.119 Be the something and the something else law 
and the staging of law in theatre. Be they opposed values and 
objectives within law, as Shakespeare would reveal them to us.  
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But of course to many, the law’s profession will lose much of its 
allure if it cannot be disconnected from ‘what is not law’, because it 
loses certainty that way.  
Then again, uncertainty precisely is what Shakespearean taught 
is about. To Lorenzo Zucca, the Bard of Avon simply is the Poet of 
Uncertainty.120 To be sure, one of his trademarks is that there always 
seems to be another interpretation possible of the situations he stages. 
The readings of the human condition he offers are never unequivocal. 
The universal laboratories for thought experiments he creates never 
produce certain findings. (And there even is some uncertainty about 
the question whether Shakespeare in fact truly wrote all of 
Shakespeare.) It is precisely the doubts, the insecurity, the indecision 
expressed in his plays that make the plays reflections of life, and 
reflections of life of enduring relevance. 
And from this a final illustration follows for actors of 
international dispute settlement, on a point we have already made: the 
unavoidable need to embrace uncertainty alerts us to the risks of 
system building in the field. Consider it in contrast to these judges of 
Nazi Germany, who, when put on trial for applying the Reich’s laws, 
sought defense in the system, in the argument that their highest calling 
was to get their own sense of justice out of the way in order to pay full 
respect to the authoritative legal order. To the contrary, it is only in 
the aggregated expressions of each actor’s own sense of justice, 
uncertain as that combination might be, that overall humanity can be 
achieved in international dispute settlement. The answer is not – or 
rather, it is not solely – in the pursuit of a system, of building logical, 
certain coherence. The answer rather lies in welcoming Shakespearean 
uncertainty. It lies in the dialectical stories we can convincingly tell.  
We cannot be Shakespearean if we cannot accept uncertainty, if 
we feel we need to close our minds, or other people’s minds. 
Independent thinking and humanity in all its diversity and 
contradictions are not things to recoil from. 
Now should we be Shakespearean to begin with? Shakespearean 
thought is a legal wave with a 400-year fetch. We might as well ride 
it, with the insouciance of a secure and adaptable thinker with a good 
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balance, confident that it will carry us back onto stable ground, 
enriched with experiences of reinforced learning. 
 
 
